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Save IRFC From Project Financing |
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AV Poulose |
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The financing arm of Indian Railways (IR),
the Indian Railway Finance Corporation (IRFC), was created by the government
in 1986, for raising funds from the open market to make up the shortfall in
provision of funds for IR by the government. According to the Allocation of
Business Rules, which govern the distribution of duties amongst the
ministries, the power of borrowing is vested in the ministry of finance
(MoF). Since MoF did not want to function as an agency for raising funds for
the railways from the open market, this public sector enterprise under the
ministry of railways (MoR) was set up to raise funds for use by the railways.
Starting on a small scale, by borrowing Rs 25.26 crore in 1987-88, by the
year 2000, it has grown into sizeable organisation with reserves worth Rs
1,505.51 crore, loan funds of Rs 12,578 crore (including long-term loans of
Rs 4 44.47 crore), net fixed assets of Rs 11,557.24 crore, and net worth of
Rs 1,737.51 crore. It has also consistently got a credit triple-A rating. The
confidence level of lenders in IRFC is very high because of it having
established itself as a success story. From inception, it has been doing leasing business, namely procuring
rolling stock — coaches, wagons and locomotives — and leasing them to IR for
30-year periods. Since the leasing charges provide for the interest payable
by IRFC to the lenders, a small amount to cover administrative charges, a
proportion for making repayments and so on, there was no real risk involved
for those who deposited their money in IRFC bonds. Since IRFC’s client is its
own owner — a government department — there was a de facto sovereign
guarantee for the payment of the lease charges. This factor boosted the level
of confidence of the lenders, and IRFC has had no difficulty whatsoever in
raising funds, except when it tried to raise funds on behalf of the Konkan
Railway Corporation. During the past few years, sporadic attempts had been made to dip into
IRFC’s kitty for financing projects and to fund the PSU’s. Except for a few aberrations,
like providing straight loans to IR itself, supporting RAILTEL, the latest
corporation in IR’s stable, and giving a bridge loan to a joint SPV under
President’s directive to get over a problem of timely Parliamentary approval,
the corporation has stuck to the safe leasing business. Renewed attempts are afoot to diversify IRFC into project financing. A
member of the aborted Railway Advisory Committee (Sam Pitroda Committee) had
suggested the creation of a Rail Infrastructure Development Fund, on the
lines of the funding of the National Highway Development Project, to be
managed and deployed by IRFC on the pattern of the National Highway Authority
of India. It is not known whether this has been considered by the MoR, but
indications becoming available reveal that IRFC is being tempted with a
possible diversification into project financing. Recently, there was an advertisement by IRFC in the newspapers inviting
subscriptions to bonds of the value of Rs 200 crore. IRFC has not been asking
for such small tranches of borrowed funds. It raises some suspicions about
the object of these bonds. Any attempts at such diversification should be nipped in the bud, since it
involves very serious implications, as brought out herein. It will be a betrayal of the trust reposed by the lenders in IRFC, since
it has been into the safe business of leasing with unassailable security. Any
diversification into project financing should be from funds raised on the
basis of a transparent indication of the purpose for which they are raised,
and on the basis of fresh credit rating for the new type of business. Such
transparency is called for by the principles of corporate governance. And the
existing lenders should be given an opportunity to withdraw in full their
deposits with IRFC. Several senior citizens like me have deposited
significant portions of their household savings in IRFC. These should not be
endangered by misadventures of IRFC. Let not IRFC do a US-64 of UTI. If the projects to be financed are from amongst those awaiting completion
on IR, they should not be touched with a barge pole. As brought out in the
White Paper on projects issued by the MoR in July 1998, an amount of Rs
35,000 crore was needed for completing the outstanding projects of which as
much as Rs 23,000 crore were for non-viable projects. Even the so-called viable projects, like electrification and gauge
conversion projects, have turned out to be totally non-viable. Of course, IR
does not furnish full details about non-viability in the Work Programme
furnished to the Parliament with the budget documents, nor does it conduct
any post-commissioning evaluation to see whether the anticipations have been
realised. Can any financial institution risk its funds and reputation for
financing such projects. If the intention is to fund projects in the joint sector, through SPVs it
will go against the very purpose of setting up IRFC on the one hand and
setting up SPVs on the other. IRFC was set up to borrow funds from the market
for railway purposes. SPVs are conceived of to bring in additionality of
resources. If IRFC funds are used for financing joint sector projects, it
defeats the objective for which IRFC was set up and nullifies the purpose for
which SPVs have been conceived of. Additio-nality of resources disappear. Risk is another factor to be weighed carefully. Selection of the project
can be done on the basis of a due diligence by an independent agency or
credit rating of the party by another independent agency, but even where all
these have been done defaults have taken place. The NPAs accumulated by the
banking sector should serve as an eye-opener. The bulk of these NPAs is due
to wilful default, which no due diligence can prevent. The MoF has tried to tighten the screws through an ordinance empowering banks
to take over or change the managements and so on to enforce recovery.
Captains of industry responded by trying to secure a differentiation between
wilful default and default for other reasons, to get an opening to stall the
operation of the stringent measures. It goes to the credit of the New Finance
Minister, Jaswant Singh, that he has introduced the relevant bill in
Parliament without any dilution. IRFC funds are mainly short-termed funds.
Project lending requires very long-term funds. And it also requires skills of a special type, which IRFC does not
possess. Any misadventure into this field can only make IRFC take the route
of downfall, as has been taken by IDBI, IFCI and ICICI. If any institutional arrangement is necessary, let it be created as an
independent one, not connected with IRFC. Let not the beginning of the end of
the success story of IRFC be scripted by it undertaking any misadventure of
project financing! (The author is a former financial commissioner, Railways &
ex-officio secretary to the Government of India) |